iR2P

Charred boot & wrecked tank, Georgia (Photo: Antonis Shen)

Three years ago, at the 2005 World Summit, 150 world leaders resolved “to create a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world and to undertake concrete measures… to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the four following areas: development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and strengthening of the United Nations.”

Under ‘peace and collective security’, emphasizing “the obligation of States to settle their disputes by peaceful means“, leaders said “we solemnly renew our commitment to promote a culture of prevention of armed conflict“, reiterating “the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations“.

Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Declaration read:

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

At the Summit, Russian diplomats argued against the inclusion of these “Responsibility to Protect” clauses and insisted on watering them down. Yet in an interview last week, the Russian Ambassador to Canada referred to the same principle to defend his country’s military actions in Georgia (which were not authorized by the Security Council): “Our tanks came to protect the lives of Ossetians and our citizens,” he said. “It is a Canadian suggestion that every United Nations country has a responsibility to protect, and in this case its so clear cut I don’t know how it can be distorted.”

As Gareth Evans has argued in today’s Los Angeles Times, this is a misapplication of R2P on several grounds. Ahead of the World Summit, Kofi Annan’s In Larger Freedom report proposed five criteria or ‘precautionary principles’ to be referred to - preferably in Security Council deliberations - when determining the legitimacy of the use of force in special circumstances. All of these present awkward questions for Russia:

1. The seriousness of the threat: What evidence of systematic, widespread atrocities is available to back Russia’s characterisation of the Georgian army’s assault on Tskhinvali as ‘genocide‘?
2. The proper purpose of the response: Was Russia’s primary intention to protect South Ossetians, or to establish full control over the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia while reasserting its influence over other neighbours?
3. Military action only as a last resort: Had non-military options truly been exhausted?
4. Proportionality of the response: Was the scale and intensity of the military response proportional to the threat (in keeping with International Humanitarian Law), or excessive?
5. The response should have reasonable chances of success, and of doing more good than harm: Geopolitical considerations aside, what are the net humanitarian consequences of Russia’s actions (bearing in mind the displacement of at least 80,000 people, the widespread use of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, the looting and burning of ethnic Georgian villages, and the unchecked behaviour of Ossetian irregular forces)?